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Financial	  Crisis:	  A	  Hardy	  Perennial:	  this	  is	  not	  just	  the	  title	  of	  the	  introductory	  chapter	  of	  Robert	  Aliber	  and	  
Charles	   Kindleberger’s	  Manias,	   Panic	   and	   Crashes	   (2011),	   but	   also	   an	   eloquent	   reminder	   of	   one	   of	   the	  
distinct	  features	  of	  financial	  markets,	  namely,	  their	  inherently	  unstable	  nature	  (Minsky	  1986).	  As	  the	  global	  
financial	  crisis	  of	  the	  late	  2000s	  vividly	  reminded	  us,	  during	  the	  upward	  trend	  of	  the	  business	  cycle,	  markets	  
are	   prone	   to	   euphoric	   behaviour	   that	   fuels	   asset	   and	   property	   bubbles.	   The	   latter	   burst	   as	   soon	   as	   the	  
business	   cycle	   deteriorates	   to	   the	   point	   where	   debts	   exceed	   what	   borrowers	   can	   pay	   off	   from	   their	  
incoming	  revenues.	   	  
	  
Recognising	   the	   perennial	   nature	   of	   financial	   instability,	   domestic	   political	   systems	   have	   over	   time	  
developed	   several	   governance	   arrangements	   that	   are	   meant	   to	   circumscribe	   the	   effects	   of	   financial	  
instability.	  These	  arrangements	   include	  prudential	   regulatory	  regimes,	   financial	  safety	  nets,	  and	   legal	  and	  
accounting	  procedures.	  Similar	  efforts	  have	  been	  undertaken	  at	  the	  global	  level,	  where	  several	  governance	  
arrangements	  exist	  which	  aim	  at	  minimising	  the	  likelihood	  of	  crisis	  and	  ensuring	  that	  those	  crises	  which	  do	  
occur	  do	  not	  become	  systemic.	  These	  arrangements,	  which	   include	  both	   formal	   institutions	  and	   informal	  
social	  practices,	  span	  those	  designed	  to	  prevent	  the	  eruption	  of	  crises	  –	  including	  surveillance	  mechanisms,	  
prudential	  rules	  and	  procedures	  for	  regulatory	  cooperation	  and	  harmonisation	  –	  and	  those	  mainly	  designed	  
to	  manage	  crises	  once	  they	  occur,	  such	  as	  the	  provisions	  that	  govern	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  global	  financial	  
safety	  net.	  	  
	  
This	  chapter	  focuses	  on	  a	  specific	  set	  of	  governance	  arrangements	  that	  has	  been	  developed	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  
contributing	   to	   global	   financial	   stability,	   namely,	   the	   arrangements	  which	   preside	   over	   the	   international	  
monitoring	  of	  national	  economic	  policies.	  Specifically,	  my	  purpose	  is	  to	  assess	  the	  changes	  that	  have	  taken	  
place	  in	  the	  governance	  framework	  for	  surveillance	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  of	  the	  late	  
2000s.	   Particular	   attention	   will	   be	   devoted	   to	   analysing	   the	   surveillance	   tasks	   that	   the	   International	  
Monetary	  Fund	  (IMF)	  performs.	  Indeed,	  the	  monitoring,	  with	  associated	  policy	  advice,	  of	  national	  economic	  
and	  financial	  policies	  is	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  that	  institution’s	  responsibilities.1	  In	  particular,	  one	  of	  the	  Fund’s	  key	  
tasks	   is	   that	   of	   ‘help[ing]	   head	   off	   risks	   to	   international	   monetary	   and	   financial	   stability,	   alert[ing]	   the	  
institution’s	   187	  member	   countries	   to	   potential	   risks	   and	   vulnerabilities,	   and	   advis[ing]	   them	   of	   needed	  
policy	  adjustments’	  (IMF	  2007).	  The	  IMF	  thus	  provides	  a	  privileged	  perspective	  from	  which	  to	  identify	  some	  
key	  developments	  in	  the	  policy	  area	  of	  surveillance	  by	  shedding	  light	  on	  ‘the	  political	  architecture	  for	  global	  
capital	  markets’	  (Pauly	  1997:	  8).	  	  
	  
Distinguishing	  among	  the	  procedural,	   instrumental	  and	   ideational	  dimensions	  of	  governance	  frameworks,	  
the	  chapter	  argues	  that	  three	  main	  post-­‐crisis	  trends	  are	  emerging	  in	  IMF	  surveillance.	  The	  first	  is	  increased	  
collaboration	  with	  other	  official	   regulatory	  bodies,	   in	  particular	  with	   the	  newly	  created	  Financial	  Stability	  
Board	  (FSB).	  The	  second	  is	  the	  deepening	  of	  financial	  sector	  surveillance	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  a	  macro-­‐
financial	  approach	  to	  global	  surveillance	  (Moschella	  2011;	  Baker	  2012).	  The	  third	  concerns	  the	  way	  in	  which	  
the	  crisis	  has	  called	  into	  question	  the	  previously	  dominant	  views	  that	  markets	  are	  self-­‐stabilising,	  and	  that	  
emerging	  market	  economies	  –	  and	  not	  advanced	  economies	  –	  are	   the	  primary	   source	  of	   risk	  and	   should	  
therefore	  be	  the	  main	  target	  of	  international	  surveillance.	  
	  
Before	  proceeding,	  some	  clarifications	  are	  in	  order.	  To	  start	  with,	  this	  chapter	   is	  not	  meant	  to	  provide	  an	  
assessment	  of	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  changes	  in	  IMF	  surveillance	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  pre-­‐crisis	  
ones.	   In	   other	   words,	   its	   purpose	   is	   not	   to	   evaluate	   whether	   the	   transformations	   in	   the	   conduct	   of	  
surveillance	  will	   lead	   the	   IMF	   to	  be	  more	  effective	   than	   in	   the	  past.	  Nor	  does	   the	   chapter	  deal	  with	   the	  
issue	  of	  democratic	  deficits	  in	  the	  governance	  arrangements	  under	  examination.	  Instead,	  its	  purpose	  is	  to	  
bring	  to	  the	  surface	  some	  of	  the	  most	  important	  changes	  that	  have	  resulted	  from	  the	  contemporary	  global	  
financial	  crisis	  in	  order	  to	  reflect	  on	  their	  transformative	  potential	  for	  global	  financial	  governance	  at	  large.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Of course, surveillance is not the only task the IMF performs. The provision of financial assistance to members facing 
a fundamental disequilibrium in their balance of payments and the provision of technical assistance are the other main 
activities that the Fund regularly discharges. Nevertheless, according to some commentators, these other tasks can be 
considered modalities of surveillance from other perspectives (see, for instance, (Guitiàn 1992: 22-25). 
I	  develop	  my	  argument	  in	  three	  steps.	  First,	  I	  tease	  out	  some	  of	  the	  conceptual	  underpinnings	  of	  financial	  
governance	  and	  introduce	  the	  key	  features	  of	  the	  pre-­‐crisis	  surveillance	  governance	  framework.	  Second,	  I	  
trace	  the	  changes	  that	  have	  taken	  place	  since	  the	  start	  of	  the	  crisis	  in	  2007.	  Finally,	  I	  summarise	  the	  findings	  
and	  reflect	  on	  their	  implications	  for	  global	  financial	  governance	  and	  for	  the	  challenges	  that	  IMF	  is	  expected	  
to	  confront	  in	  the	  near	  future.	  	  	  
	  
Governing	  financial	  stability:	  three	  governance	  dimensions	  and	  pre-­‐crisis	  trends	  
	  
Although	   international	   financial	   stability	  may	   at	   first	   glance	   appear	   as	   a	   technical	  matter	   that	   is	   remote	  
from	  citizens’	  most	  pressing	   concerns,	   this	   is	   clearly	   not	   the	   case.	  Episodes	  of	   distress	   in	   global	   financial	  
markets,	   including	   those	   that	  arise	   from	  poor	  domestic	  policies	  or	   international	  capital	  withdrawals,	  may	  
destroy	  the	  capacity	  of	  the	  domestic	  financial	  sector	  to	  generate	  credit	  for	  activities	  such	  as	  consumption	  
and	  investment.	  The	  resulting	  impact	  on	  the	  real	  economy,	  in	  terms	  of	  output	  loss	  and	  unemployment,	  can	  
be	  severe	  and	   long-­‐lasting,	  as	  the	  global	   financial	  crisis	  has	  once	  again	  vividly	  confirmed.	   In	   light	  of	  these	  
considerations,	   it	   is	   therefore	  not	   surprising	   that	   financial	   stability	   is	  usually	   considered	  as	  a	  public	   good	  
(Kindleberger	   1973)	   and	   that	   states,	   regulatory	   authorities	   and	   even	   market	   participants	   devote	  
considerable	   time	   and	   resources	   to	   designing	   international	   rules	   and	   institutions	   that	   can	   mitigate	   the	  
tendency	  of	  financial	  turmoil	  to	  spill	  across	  borders	  (Abdelal	  2007;	  Baker	  2006;	  Kapstein	  1994;	  Pauly	  1997;	  
Porter	  2005;	  Singer	  2007).	  	  
	  
The	  IMF	  and	  its	  monitoring	  of	  national	  economic	  policies	  have	  long	  played	  a	  primary	  role	  in	  the	  governance	  
framework	  that	  aims	  at	  preventing	  financial	  instability	  and	  managing	  crises	  once	  they	  occur.	  As	  conceived	  
in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  the	  global	  governance	  framework	  was	  based	  on	  a	  clear	  code	  of	  
conduct	   that	   set	   up	   the	   rules	   that	   national	   authorities	   were	   expected	   to	   follow.	   Under	   the	   par-­‐valued	  
exchange	  rate	  system,	  the	  international	  monitoring	  of	  the	  Fund	  consisted	  in	  the	  application	  of	  these	  rules	  
of	  conduct,	  meaning	  that	  national	  policies	  were	   judged	   in	  terms	  of	   their	  consistency	  with	  the	  agreed	  par	  
values.	  With	  the	  break-­‐up	  of	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  system	  in	  the	  1970s,	  however,	  the	  rule-­‐based	  system	  of	  
global	   surveillance	   gave	   way	   to	   a	   discretion-­‐based	   system	   in	   which	   the	   IMF’s	   assessment	   of	   national	  
policies	   was	   no	   longer	   exclusively	   anchored	   to	   the	   stability	   of	   currencies’	   par	   values.	   With	   the	  
abandonment	   of	   the	   fixed	   exchange	   rate	   system,	   and	   the	   integration	   of	   world’s	   financial	   markets	   and	  
associated	   challenges	   (Helleiner	   1994),	   the	   assessment	   of	   the	   consistency	   of	   national	   policies	   with	   the	  
international	  financial	  stability	  commitment	  became	  a	  much	  more	  discretionary	  and	  complicated	  task.	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  analyse	  the	  main	  characteristics	  of	  global	  surveillance	  in	  the	  period	  that	  preceded	  the	  crisis	  of	  
the	   late	  2000s,	   it	   is	   important	  to	   identify	  a	  metric	  for	  such	  a	   judgment.	   In	  this	  connection,	   I	  break	  up	  the	  
concept	  of	  governance	   into	   three	  dimensions	   that	   refer	   to	   the	  process	   through	  which	  policy	   solutions	   to	  
specific	  problems	  are	  produced,	  the	  instruments	  through	  these	  solutions	  are	  achieved	  and,	  finally,	  the	  core	  
beliefs	   that	   actors	  widely	   share	   on	  how	   to	   govern	   a	   specific	   issue	   area.	   In	  what	   follows,	   I	   focus	   on	   each	  
dimension	  in	  turn	  and	  exemplify	  them	  through	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  pre-­‐crisis	  governance	  framework	  in	  the	  
area	  of	  global	  surveillance.	  
	  
First,	   governance	   systems	   vary	   according	   to	   the	  modalities	   through	   which	   policy	   solutions	   are	   taken	   or	  
political	  action	  is	  exercised.	  A	  key	  dimension	  here	  is	  the	  number	  of	  actors	  that	  are	  involved	  in	  the	  decision-­‐
making	  process	  or	   in	  the	  delivery	  of	  a	  specific	  course	  of	  action.	  For	   instance,	   it	   is	  plausible	  to	  conceive	  of	  
governance	   systems	  as	   varying	   along	   a	   continuum	   that	   ranges	   from	  centralised	   to	   fragmented.	  Whereas	  
the	  former	  are	  characterised	  by	  the	  prevalence	  of	  one	  actor	  over	  the	  others,	   the	   latter	  are	  based	  on	  the	  
collaboration	  of	  several	  actors	  for	  either	  adopting	  policies	  or	  carrying	  out	  the	  necessary	  political	  action	  to	  
solve	  the	  specific	  problems	  of	  the	  governance	  area.	  	  
	  
In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   global	   surveillance	   framework,	   the	   IMF	   has	   long	   occupied	   a	   primary	   position	   in	   the	  
governance	  of	   this	   issue	  area.	  The	  central	   role	  of	   the	  Fund	  was	  maintained	  even	   in	   the	  aftermath	  of	   the	  
collapse	  of	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  system,	  when	  the	  Fund’s	  responsibilities	  changed	  from	  those	  of	  an	  enforcer	  
of	  member	   countries’	   observance	  of	   exchange-­‐rate	   rules	   to	   those	  of	   an	  overseer	  of	   individual	   countries’	  
exchange-­‐rate	  policies	  (Guitiàn	  1992:	  6).	  Since	  the	  early	  1990s,	  however,	  several	  international	  and	  regional	  
bodies	  have	  assumed	  increasing	  importance	  in	  the	  conduct	  of	  surveillance	  activity.	  Along	  with	  the	  IMF	  and	  
the	   traditional	   surveillance	   functions	   exercised	   by	   the	   Bank	   for	   International	   Settlements	   (BIS)	   and	   the	  
Organisation	  for	  Economic	  Cooperation	  and	  Development	  (OECD),	  a	  more	  prominent	  role	  has	  progressively	  
been	   played	   by	   groups	   such	   as	   the	  Group	   of	   20	   (G20),	   regional	   economic	   groups,	   the	   Financial	   Stability	  
Board	  (FSB),	  and	  regional/country-­‐specific	  financial	  stability	  risk	  boards.	  	  
	  
The	  growing	  relevance	  of	  these	  bodies	  and	  the	  attendant	  fragmentation	  of	  the	  governance	  framework	  can	  
be	   explained	   by	   the	   shortcomings	   of	   the	   Fund’s	   surveillance	   which	   were	   brought	   to	   the	   surface	   by	   the	  
emerging	   market	   crises	   of	   the	   1990s	   (Independent	   Evaluation	   Office	   2004,	   2005;	   IMF	   1999;	   Moschella	  
2010).	   The	   Fund	   repeatedly	   failed	   in	   identifying	   and	  warning	   about	   the	   incipient	   risks	   to	   global	   financial	  
stability.2	  The	  complexity	  and	   interconnections	   that	  characterise	   today’s	  global	   financial	  markets	  are	  also	  
helpful	   in	  explaining	   the	   increasing	  dispersion	  of	   supervisory	  powers	  among	  several	   international	  bodies.	  
Since	  an	  effective	  surveillance	  needs	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  macro-­‐financial	  linkages	  and	  linkages	  across	  sectors	  
and	  countries,	  up-­‐to-­‐date	  data	  and	  analyses	  are	  needed	  on	  domestic	  regulatory	  and	  supervisory	  structures,	  
as	   well	   as	   on	   various	   market	   segments.	   No	   single	   organisation	   or	   regulatory	   body	   can	   be	   expected	  
successfully	  to	  collect	  and	  analyse	  all	  the	  relevant	  information.	  The	  division	  of	  surveillance	  functions	  across	  
several	   bodies	   can	   therefore	   increase	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   this	   important	   activity,	   even	   though	   one	   the	  
unintended	  consequences	  could	  be	  duplications	  of	  work	  (Schinasi	  &	  Truman	  2010).	  
	  
Second,	  governance	  systems	  also	  vary	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  instruments	  that	  are	  used	  to	  achieve	  the	  stated	  goal	  
of	   a	   policy	   decision.	   In	   this	   connection,	   it	   is	   plausible	   to	   think	   of	   governance	   systems	   as	   varying	   along	   a	  
spectrum	  that	  ranges	  from	  the	  use	  of	  hard-­‐law	  instruments	  to	  the	  use	  of	  soft-­‐law	  instruments.	  That	   is	  to	  
say,	  whereas	  some	  governance	  systems	  may	  be	  characterised	  by	  strong	  enforcement	  mechanisms,	  others	  
are	   based	   on	   instruments	   such	   as	   persuasion	   and	   cooperation.	   The	   latter	  may	   be	   attractive	   for	   national	  
governments	   that	   want	   to	   limit	   sovereignty	   losses.	   In	   contrast,	   governance	   systems	   based	   on	   hard-­‐law	  
imply	  delegation	  of	  ‘authority	  for	  interpreting	  and	  implementing	  the	  law’	  (Abbott	  &	  Snidal	  2000:	  421-­‐22),	  
which	  refers	  to	  precise,	  legally	  binding	  obligations.	  	  
	  
The	  distinction	  between	  hard	  and	  soft	   instruments	  has	  been	  useful	   in	  examining	  multilateral	  surveillance	  
activities	  such	  as	  those	  that	  the	  OECD	  regularly	  carries	  out.	  In	  particular,	  it	  has	  been	  noted	  that	  surveillance	  
can	  be	  associated	  with	  two	  different	  sets	  of	  instruments.	  The	  first	  are	  coercive	  instruments,	  which	  induce	  
the	  fear	  of	  being	  punished.	  The	  use	  of	  economic	  sanctions	  and	  financial	  pressures	  belongs	  to	  this	  category	  
of	   surveillance	   instruments.	   The	   second	   are	   instruments	   based	   on	   persuasion	   and	   moral	   pressures,	  
including	  shaming,	  ridiculing	  and	  exclusion	  (Marcussen	  2004:	  13).	  
	  
Next	   to	   their	   degree	   of	   stringency,	   surveillance	   instruments	   can	   also	   be	   distinguished	   according	   to	   the	  
target	   of	   policy	   analysis	   and	   advice.	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   some	   surveillance	   instruments	   focus	   on	   assessing	  
domestic	   macroeconomic	   management,	   while	   others	   are	   more	   tailored	   to	   assessing	   the	   robustness	   of	  
regulatory,	   supervisory	   and	   crisis	   management	   systems.	   As	   for	   the	   IMF,	   the	   original	   core	   of	   the	   Fund	  
surveillance	  was	  macroeconomic	  analysis.	  The	  IMF	  has	  traditionally	  analysed	  and	  provided	  advice	  on	  issues	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The global financial crisis has been no exception here. As will be clarified at greater length below, the IMF – as most 
other international observers – failed to clearly identify the signs of the incipient risks to global financial stability and to 
elicit action from global policy-makers (Independent Evaluation Office 2011). 
such	  as	   the	  choice	  of	   the	  exchange	   rate	  and	   the	  consistency	  between	   the	   regime	  of	   fiscal	  and	  monetary	  
policy.	  In	  contrast,	  financial	  sector	  issues	  largely	  fell	  outside	  the	  purview	  of	  its	  monitoring	  activity	  at	  least	  
until	   the	  mid	   1990s	   (Gola	  &	   Spadafora	   2009).	   The	   limited	   attention	   devoted	   to	   financial	   sector	   issues	   is	  
largely	  attributable	   to	   the	   characteristics	  of	   the	   IMF	  as	  an	  economic	  organization.	   In	  particular,	  both	   the	  
composition	  of	  its	  staff,	  which	  is	  primarily	  recruited	  from	  the	  macroeconomics	  profession	  (Momani	  2005),	  
and	   the	   institutional	   mandate	   that	   govern	   the	   Fund’s	   activities	   have	   oriented	   the	   focus	   of	   surveillance	  
towards	  macroeconomic	  factors	  (Moschella	  2012b).	  
	  
From	  the	  early	  1990s	  onwards,	  however,	  the	  range	  of	   IMF	  surveillance	  instruments	  has	  been	  significantly	  
expanded	  to	   include	  financial	  sector	   issues.	  Member	  countries’	  policies	  to	  develop	  the	  domestic	   financial	  
sector,	  and	  ensure	  sound	  governance	  and	  risk	  management	  in	  financial	  institutions	  have	  been	  increasingly	  
included	   in	  the	  Fund’s	  analyses.	  Several	   factors	  contributed	  to	  the	  expansion	  of	   IMF	  surveillance	  towards	  
financial	   sector	   surveillance	   (FSS),	   including	   the	   growing	   integration	   of	   global	   financial	   markets	   and	   the	  
attendant	  recognition	  of	  the	  risks	  that	  such	  integration	  entails,	  as	  exemplified	  in	  the	  financial	  crises	  of	  the	  
1990s	   (Gola	   &	   Spadafora	   2009;	   James	   1995;	   Moschella	   2011).	   However,	   the	   development	   of	   financial	  
sector	   analyses	   has	   not	   been	   an	   automatic	   and	   rapid	   process	   with	   the	   result	   that	   financial	   sector	  
surveillance	  was	  still	   a	  work-­‐in-­‐progress	  process	  when	   the	  global	   financial	   crisis	  burst	   (Moschella	  2012b).	  
One	   of	   the	   negative	   implications	   of	   the	   poor	   development	   of	   FSS	   within	   the	   Fund	   has	   been	   that	   the	  
organization’s	  failure	  to	  spot	  the	  severe	  risks	  and	  vulnerabilities	  that	  were	  building	  up	  in	  the	  global	  financial	  
system	   from	   2004	   to	   2007.	   Indeed,	   staff	   continued	   to	   focus	   on	   factors	   such	   as	   global	   imbalances	   and	  
disorderly	  dollar	  decline	  as	  the	  key	  risks	  to	  global	  stability,	  largely	  failing	  to	  identify	  the	  risks	  building	  up	  in	  
the	  financial	  sector	  where	  in	  fact	  the	  crisis	  burst	  (Independent	  Evaluation	  Office	  2011).	  
	  
Finally,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	  distinguish	  different	   kinds	  of	   governance	   arrangements	   and	   trace	   their	   evolution	  
over	  time	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  core	  beliefs	  that	  inform	  the	  conduct	  of	  a	  specific	  area	  of	  activity.	  Indeed,	  each	  
policy	  area	   is	   characterised	  by	   the	  presence	  of	  a	  deep	  core	  of	   fundamental	  norms	  and	  beliefs	  which	  are	  
regarded	  as	  widely	  shared	  in	  a	  policy	  community	  (Sabatier	  &	  Jenkins-­‐Smith	  1993).	  Core	  beliefs	  are	  distinct	  
from	  policy	  solutions	  or	  strategies	  in	  that	  they	  identify	  basic	  normative	  preferences	  (Steinmo	  2003).	  That	  is	  
to	  say,	  core	  beliefs	  provide	  agents	  with	  not	  only	  a	  ‘scientific’,	  but	  also	  a	  ‘normative’	  account	  of	  how	  a	  polity	  
or	   a	   specific	   policy	   sector	   is	   expected	   to	   operate,	   defining	   ‘what	   the	   common	   end	   of	   collective	   action	  
should	  in	  fact	  be’	  (Blyth	  2002:	  38;	  Berman	  1998:	  29).	  
	  
Some	  distinctive	  beliefs	  characterised	  the	  governance	  of	  the	  policy	  area	  of	  global	  surveillance	  in	  the	  run-­‐up	  
to	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis.	  Specifically,	  one	  of	  the	  hallmarks	  of	  the	  pre-­‐crisis	  financial	  governance	  was	  the	  
widespread	  faith	  in	  financial	  markets	  as	  a	  stabilising	  and	  efficient	  mechanism	  to	  ensure	  global	  stability	  and	  
thereby	  mitigate	  the	  risks	  associated	  with	  the	  integration	  of	  world’s	  capital	  markets	  (Baker	  2012;	  Helleiner,	  
Pagliari	  &	  Zimmermann	  2009).	  This	  specific	  world	  view	  of	  financial	  markets	  emphasized	  their	  self-­‐stabilising	  
quality	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  rational	  efficiency	  and	  capacity	  to	  process	  and	  respond	  to	  information	  (Best	  2010;	  
Blyth	   2003).	   Since	   private	   actors	   were	   regarded	   as	   having	   a	   comparative	   informational	   and	   expertise	  
advantage	   over	   public	   authorities,	   the	   latter	   tended	   to	   delegate	   to	   the	   former	   traditional	   governmental	  
functions.	  For	  instance,	  in	  the	  area	  of	  market	  regulation,	  Adrienne	  Heritier	  and	  Dirk	  Lehmkuhl	  (2011)	  have	  
found	  that	  governments	  tend	  to	  rely	  more	  frequently	  on	  self-­‐regulation	  by	  sectoral	  experts,	  particularly	  in	  
areas	  of	  highly	  complex	  issues	  of	  market	  regulation.	  The	  belief	  in	  the	  stabilizing	  role	  of	  the	  markets	  and	  in	  
their	  superior	  informational	  set	  had	  important	  policy	  implications	  for	  the	  conduct	  of	  surveillance.	  	  
	  
To	  start	  with,	  the	  widespread	  faith	  in	  markets	  as	  agents	  of	  financial	  stability	  led	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  
‘right’	  purpose	  of	  international	  surveillance	  should	  have	  been	  that	  of	  enhancing	  transparency	  (see	  also	  Best	  
2005).	  Increased	  information	  would	  have	  allowed	  market	  participants	  to	  make	  more	  informed	  and	  rational	  
investment	   decisions,	   enabling	   them	   to	   discipline	   those	   countries	   judged	   to	   be	   following	   inappropriate	  
policies	  and	   therefore	  ensure	  global	   financial	   stability.	  The	  belief	   in	   the	   self-­‐stabilising	  quality	  of	  markets	  
also	   led	   to	   the	   reliance	  on	  market	  discipline	  as	  an	   instrument	   to	  enforce	  global	   surveillance.	   Indeed,	   it	   is	  
possible	   to	   say	   that	   one	   the	   most	   important	   pre-­‐crisis	   trends	   was	   the	   partial	   privatisation	   of	   global	  
surveillance	   activity	   as	   part	   of	   a	   broader	   trend	   towards	   the	   involvement	   of	   the	   private	   sector	   in	   global	  
economic	  and	   financial	   governance	   (Cutler,	  Haufler	  &	  Porter	  1999;	  Graz	  &	  Nölke	  2008;	  Hall	  &	  Biersteker	  
2002).	  	  
	  
This	   is	   particularly	   evident	   in	   the	   standards	   and	   codes	   initiative	  which	   followed	   the	  Asian	   financial	   crisis.	  
The	   logic	   that	   underpinned	   this	   initiative	   was	   that	   international	   financial	   standards	  might	   be	   of	   help	   to	  
promote	   good	   economic	   policies	   and	   transparency	   and	   therefore	   contribute	   to	   international	   financial	  
stability	  (Financial	  Stability	  Forum,	  2001;	  2000).	  Nevertheless,	   it	  was	  also	  widely	  believed	  that	  the	  success	  
of	   the	   international	   standardisation	   initiative	   was	   closely	   dependent	   on	   the	   involvement	   of	   the	   private	  
sector	   (Mosley	   2003).	   If	  market	   participants	   had	   assessed	   countries’	   performance	   against	   internationally	  
recognised	   standards	   in	   their	   investment	   decisions,	   thereby	   pricing	   capital	   on	   the	   record	   of	   compliance	  
with	   international	   standards,	   the	   threats	   to	   international	   financial	   stability	   would	   have	   been	   reduced	  
(Fischer	  1999).	  The	   initiative	  consequently	  delegated	  the	   international	  monitoring	  of	  domestic	  policies	   to	  
the	  private	  sector	  by	  giving	  it	  the	  task	  of	  assessing	  domestic	  policies	  against	  globally	  defined	  standards	  and	  
enforcing	  them,	  ‘as	  non-­‐compliance	  would	  send	  negative	  signals	  to	  the	  international	  financial	  community,	  
resulting	  in	  possible	  capital	  flight	  and	  investment	  strike’	  (Soederberg	  2003:	  13).	  
	  
Finally,	   it	   is	   interesting	   to	   note	   that	   another	   core	   belief	   of	   the	   pre-­‐crisis	   governance	   framework	  was	   the	  
assumption	  that	  the	  main	  threat	  to	  global	  financial	  stability	  would	  have	  emanated	  from	  the	  vulnerabilities	  
in	  the	  domestic	  financial	  system	  of	  emerging	  market	  countries.	  This	  belief	  was	  nurtured	  by	  the	  experience	  
of	  the	  Asian	  crisis.	  The	  fact	  that	  weaknesses	  in	  domestic	  financial	  sectors	  –	  substantial	  foreign	  borrowing	  by	  
the	  private	  sector	  and	  a	  weak	  and	  over-­‐exposed	  banking	  system	  –	  significantly	  contributed	  to	  the	  severity	  
of	   the	   1997	   crisis	   strengthened	   the	   position	   of	   those	   who	   argued	   that	   the	   focus	   of	   international	  
surveillance	   should	   shift	   towards	   the	   assessment	   of	   the	   domestic	   financial	   systems	   of	   emerging	  market	  
countries	  (see	  Eichengreen	  1999;	  Goldstein	  1999;	  Kenen	  2001).	  One	  of	  the	  most	  visible	  implications	  of	  this	  
belief	  was	  that	  the	  aforementioned	  international	  financial	  standard	  initiative	  was	  directed	  at	  the	  diffusion	  
of	  international	  financial	  standards,	  modelled	  upon	  those	  of	  the	  Western	  countries	  (Mosley	  2010,	  738).	  The	  
expectation	   was	   that	   the	   diffusion	   of	   the	   standards	   developed	   in	   the	   advanced	   economies	   would	   have	  
diminished	  the	  probability	  of	  a	  crisis	  in	  an	  emerging	  country	  with	  the	  attendant	  global	  contagion.	  
	  
In	  short,	  the	  governance	  of	  global	  surveillance	  in	  the	  late	  1990s	  was	  staked	  on	  the	  premise	  that	  the	  main	  
risk	   to	   the	  global	  economy	  was	   likely	   to	  materialise	   in	   the	  domestic	   financial	   system	  of	  emerging	  market	  
countries.	  Hence,	   these	  countries	  were	  encouraged	   to	  bring	   their	  domestic	   financial	   systems	   in	   line	  with	  
those	  of	  the	  advanced	  countries	  by	  following	  internationally	  recognised	  standards	  of	  financial	  conduct.	   In	  
other	  words,	   it	  was	   ‘implicitly	  assumed	  that	   [Western]	  regulatory	  systems	  had	  been	  operating	  efficiently’	  
(Walter	  2008:	  22,	  24).	   The	  unleashing	  of	   the	  global	   financial	   crisis	  proved	   these	  assumptions	  wrong.	  The	  
Western	  world	  expected	  the	  crisis	  to	  erupt	  in	  a	  developing	  country	  whereas,	  in	  fact,	  it	  erupted	  in	  the	  most	  
sophisticated	   financial	  market	   in	   the	  world.	   In	  what	   follows,	   I	   trace	  what	  has	  changed	   in	   the	  governance	  
framework	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  crisis	  using	  as	  a	  benchmark	  the	  three	  dimensions	  just	  outlined.	  	  
	  
	  
Emerging	  post-­‐crisis	  governance	  forms	  
	  
The	   global	   financial	   crisis,	   like	   most	   of	   the	   other	   crises	   that	   preceded	   it,	   has	   dramatically	   shown	   the	  
challenges	   that	   global	   surveillance	   faces	   in	   light	   of	   the	   integration	   and	   complexity	   of	   world’s	   financial	  
markets.	   The	   IMF	   failed	   to	   identify	   the	   risks	   that	  were	   building	   up	   in	   the	   global	   financial	   system	   and	   to	  
provide	   clear	   warnings	   to	   spur	   remedial	   political	   action.	   Specifically,	   the	   IMF	   performed	   poorly	   in	  
identifying	  the	  risks	  that	  were	  building	  up	  in	  the	  US	  housing	  sector,	  as	  well	  as	  those	  in	  the	  global	  financial	  
system	  as	  a	  whole	  as	  the	  result	  of	  the	  securitisation	  of	  mortgages	  and	  the	  reliance	  on	  the	  shadow	  banking	  
system	   (Independent	   Evaluation	   Office	   2011).	   Likewise,	   it	   proved	   unable	   to	   appreciate	   the	   channels	   of	  
global	   financial	   contagion	   and	   their	   implications	   for	   the	   real	   economy.	   These	   problems,	  which	  were	   not	  
unique	  to	  the	  IMF	  but	  common	  to	  most	  of	  the	  international	  bodies	  tasked	  with	  surveillance	  responsibilities,	  
were	  compounded	  by	  severe	  blind	  spots	   in	   the	  data	  available	  to	   financial	   regulators	  and	  supervisors.	  For	  
instance,	   there	  have	  been	   serious	   information	   gaps	   about	   the	  quality	  of	   securitised	   instruments	   and	   the	  
global	   interconnections	  of	  financial	   institutions	  via	  derivative	  transactions	  (Financial	  Stability	  Board	  &	  IMF	  
2009).	  
	  
Faced	   with	   its	   weaknesses,	   the	   Fund	   has	   started	   an	   in-­‐house	   reflection	   on	   the	   key	   elements	   of	   its	  
surveillance	   strategy	   (IMF	   2009b,	   2010a,	   2011b)	   and	   embarked	   on	   a	   process	   of	   reform	   to	   improve	   its	  
activities.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  Fund	  has	  been	  called	  on	  to	  expand	  its	  surveillance	  repertoire	  by	  the	  Group	  
of	  20	   (G20)	   leaders	  and	  has	  been	   involved	   in	  new	  surveillance	   initiatives	  with	  other	   international	  bodies.	  
Let	  us	  assess	  these	  changes	  against	  the	  three	  governance	  dimensions	  identified	  in	  the	  previous	  section.	  
	  
First,	   in	  relation	  to	  the	  process	  through	  which	  policy	  solutions	  are	  produced,	  one	  of	  the	  consequences	  of	  
the	   post-­‐crisis	   reform	   process	   has	   been	   increased	   collaboration	   between	   the	   IMF	   and	   other	   regulatory	  
bodies,	  namely,	  the	  G20	  Leaders	  and	  the	  FSB.	  The	  IMF	  has	  been	  asked	  to	  expand	  its	  monitoring	  activities	  by	  
assessing	  the	  compatibility	  of	  the	  G20	  countries’	  national	  economic	  policies	  with	  the	  objective	  of	  achieving	  
strong,	   sustainable	   and	   balanced	   growth	   within	   the	   framework	   of	   the	   Mutual	   Assessment	   Programme	  
(MAP).	   The	  Fund	  has	  also	  been	   involved	   in	   a	  number	  of	   surveillance	  activities	   carried	  out	   in	   conjunction	  
with	  the	  FSB,	  which	  include	  the	  IMF-­‐FSB	  Data	  Initiative	  and	  the	  Early	  Warning	  Exercise	  (EWE).	  
	  
The	  Data	  Initiative	  aims	  at	  redressing	  one	  of	  the	  problems	  experienced	  during	  the	  crisis,	  namely,	  the	  lack	  of	  
information	   on	   key	   financial	   sector	   vulnerabilities	   relevant	   for	   financial	   stability	   analysis.	   Indeed,	   at	   the	  
height	  of	  the	  crisis,	   it	  became	  clear	  that	  there	  were	  scarcely	  any	  data	  available	  on	  the	   level	  of	  borrowing	  
outside	  the	  traditional	  banking	  system,	  exposures	  taken	  through	  complex	  instruments,	  or	  the	  cross-­‐border	  
linkages	   of	   financial	   institutions.	   As	   a	   result,	   measuring	   risks	   deriving	   from	   maturity	   transformation	   or	  
assessing	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  financial	  institutions	  and	  markets	  were	  interconnected	  proved	  very	  difficult.	  
The	  IMF-­‐FSB	  Data	  Initiative	  has	  thus	  started	  identifying	  the	  main	  gaps	  that	  need	  to	  be	  covered,	  as	  well	  as	  
the	   lead	   international	   agency	   that	   will	   take	   responsibility	   for	   collecting	   the	   relevant	   data	   for	   each	   area	  
(Clegg	   and	   Moschella	   forthcoming).	   The	   EWE,	   in	   turn,	   is	   an	   attempt	   to	   signal	   trends	   that	   could	   make	  
markets	   or	   countries	   vulnerable	   to	   unanticipated	   events.	   It	   is	  meant	   to	   analyse	   vulnerabilities	   in	   depth,	  
focusing	  on	  channels	  of	  transmission	  and	  contagion	  (IMF,	  2010b:	  10).	  Both	  the	  IMF-­‐FSB	  Data	  Initiative	  and	  
the	  EWE	  were	  expressly	  mandated	  by	  the	  G20	  Leaders,	  respectively	  in	  April	  2009	  and	  November	  2008.	  
	  
These	   joint	   initiatives	   confirm	   one	   of	   the	   key	   pre-­‐crisis	   trends,	   namely,	   the	   dispersion	   of	   surveillance	  
responsibilities	   in	   the	  governance	   framework	  among	  several	   international	  bodies.	  This	   is	  also	  particularly	  
evident	  in	  the	  new	  functions	  attributed	  to	  the	  FSB	  (Griffith-­‐Jones,	  Helleiner	  &	  Woods	  2010;	  Helleiner	  2010;	  
Moschella	   2012a).	   Indeed,	   one	   of	   the	  main	   changes	   associated	  with	   the	   transformation	   of	   the	   Financial	  
Stability	   Forum	   (FSF)	   into	   the	   FSB	   in	   April	   2009	   was	   the	   enhancement	   of	   the	   monitoring	   functions	  
attributed	  to	  the	  new	  body.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  tasks	  that	  had	  already	  been	  mandated	  to	  the	  FSF	  –	  to	  assess	  
vulnerabilities	   affecting	   the	   financial	   system,	   identify	   and	   oversee	   action	   needed	   to	   address	   them,	   and	  
promote	  coordination	  and	  information	  exchange	  among	  authorities	  responsible	  for	  financial	  stability	  –	  the	  
FSB	  has	  been	  tasked	  with	  the	  responsibilities	  of	  a)	  monitoring	  and	  advising	  on	  market	  developments	  and	  
their	   implications	  for	  regulatory	  policy,	  b)	  advising	  on	  and	  monitoring	  best	  practice	   in	  meeting	  regulatory	  
standards,	  and	  c)	  undertaking	   joint	  strategic	  reviews	  of	  the	  policy	  development	  work	  of	  the	   international	  
standard	   setter	   bodies	   (SSBs)	   to	   ensure	   their	   work	   is	   timely,	   coordinated,	   focused	   on	   priorities	   and	  
addressing	  gaps	  (Article	  2	  of	  the	  FSB	  Charter).3	  	  
	  
The	  FSB	  has	  also	  started	  been	  tasked	  with	  the	  responsibility	  of	  conducting	  a	  programme	  of	  peer	  reviews,	  
consisting	   of	   both	   thematic	   reviews	   and	   country	   reviews.	   Whereas	   thematic	   reviews	   focus	   on	   the	  
implementation	  across	  the	  FSB	  membership	  of	  the	  financial	  standards	  developed	  by	  SSBs	  and	  analyze	  areas	  
important	   for	  global	   financial	  stability,	  country	  reviews	  focus	  on	  the	   implementation	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  
regulatory,	   supervisory	   or	   other	   financial	   sector	   policies	   in	   a	   specific	   FSB	   member	   jurisdiction.	   Country	  
reviews	  are	  also	  conducted	  in	  cooperation	  with	  the	  international	  financial	  institutions	  in	  that	  they	  examine	  
the	  steps	  taken	  or	  planned	  by	  national	  authorities	  to	  address	  the	  recommendations	  contained	  in	  the	  IMF-­‐
World	  Bank	  Financial	  Sector	  Assessment	  Program	  (FSAP)	  and	  Reports	  on	  the	  Observance	  of	  Standards	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The other tasks attributed to the FSB are those of setting guidelines for the establishment of supervisory colleges; 
managing contingency planning for cross-border crisis management; and collaborating with the IMF to conduct Early 
Warning Exercises.   
Codes	   (ROSCs).	   In	   short,	   the	  bulk	  of	   the	  new	   functions	  delegated	   to	   the	   FSB	   revolve	  around	   those	  of	   an	  
enhanced	  monitoring	  of	  global	   stability	  and	  domestic	   regulatory	  and	   financial	  policies,	   therefore	  creating	  
the	  conditions	  for	  potential	  duplication	  of	  work	  with	  the	  IMF.	  	  
	  
Second,	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  instruments	  through	  which	  global	  surveillance	  is	  conducted,	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  debate	  
and	  reforms	  indicate	  a	  twofold	  development.	  To	  start	  with,	  there	  is	  a	  persistent	  reluctance	  to	  rely	  on	  hard	  
measures	  to	  ensure	  compliance	  with	  the	  recommended	  policy	  advice.4	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  there	  have	  been	  no	  
serious	  attempts	  at	   strengthening	   the	  corrective	  arm	  of	  global	   surveillance.	  Rather,	   in	   the	  2011	  Triennial	  
Surveillance	   Review,	   the	   IMF	   emphasised	   ‘the	   heavy	   premium’	   that	   its	   membership	   places	   ‘on	   the	  
cooperative	   nature	   of	   the	   institution’,	   therefore	   rejecting	   the	   use	   of	   sanctions	   or	   other	   hard-­‐quality	  
instruments	  to	  enforce	  compliance	  with	  surveillance	  recommendations	  (IMF	  2011a:	  11).	  The	  reluctance	  to	  
embrace	  hard	  measures	  to	  enforce	  the	  findings	  of	  global	  surveillance	  is	  also	  evident	  in	  the	  workings	  of	  the	  
FSB.	   Specifically,	   in	   spite	   of	   the	   expansion	   of	   the	   FSB’s	   responsibilities	   in	   enforcing	   compliance	   with	  
international	  standards,	   the	  procedure	   for	  addressing	  the	  consequences	  of	  non-­‐compliance	  has	  not	  been	  
clarified	  (Helleiner	  2010,	  18).	  The	  decision-­‐making	  rules	  that	  have	  been	  designed	  for	  the	  Plenary,	  which	  is	  
the	  FSB	  decision-­‐making	  body,	  constitute	  a	  further	  problem	  for	  the	  enforcement	  of	  global	  surveillance.	  In	  
particular,	  the	  Plenary	  operates	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  consensus	  meaning	  that	  a	  decision	  is	  considered	  adopted	  if	  
no	  voting	  member	  oppose	  it	  or	  actively	  vote	  against	  it	  if	  given	  the	  opportunity.	  Here	  the	  potential	  problem	  
is	   that	   the	   required	   unanimity	   implied	   in	   the	   consensus	   rule	  may	  weaken	   the	   FSB’s	   capacity	   to	   enforce	  
members’	   compliance	   with	   their	   commitments	   to	   undergo	   peer-­‐reviews	   and	   implement	   international	  
financial	   standards.	   Indeed,	   it	   is	   hard	   to	   see	   how	   a	   non-­‐complying	   jurisdiction	  will	   have	   its	  membership	  
revoked	   if	   a	   consensual	   decision	   is	   needed	   in	   the	   Plenary	   (see	   also	   Baker	   2010:	   22;	   Helleiner	   2010:	   11;	  
Moschella	  2012a).	  
	  
Furthermore,	   the	   post-­‐crisis	   debate	   and	   reforms	   indicate	   renewed	   efforts	   in	   integrating	   financial	   sector	  
issues	   into	   regular	   surveillance.	   These	  are	  exemplified	   in	  a	  number	  of	  policy	   initiatives.	   For	   instance,	   the	  
IMF’s	   financial	   stability	   assessments	   under	   the	   Financial	   Sector	   Assessment	   Program	   (FSAP)	   have	   been	  
made	  mandatory	  for	  25	  members	  with	  systemically	  important	  financial	  sectors	  in	  an	  explicit	  recognition	  of	  
the	  devastating	  implications	  that	  financial	  regulatory	  issues	  can	  have	  for	  global	  stability	  and	  economic	  well-­‐
being.	  The	  IMF	  has	  launched	  the	  vulnerability	  exercise	  for	  advanced	  and	  emerging	  market	  economies	  (VEA	  
and	   VEE)	   and	   low-­‐income	   countries	   (LICs)	   alike.	   The	   EWE	   the	   Fund	   conducts	   with	   the	   FSB	   is	   a	   further	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 An exception to this trend is represented by the surveillance reforms in Europe, where the European Union (EU) 
Commission has advanced proposals that include fines and other penalties from countries that deviate from the 
recommendations issued under the EU multilateral surveillance exercise. 
example	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  Fund	  is	  strengthening	  its	  oversight	  of	  financial	  sector	  issues.	  Indeed,	  in	  the	  
attempt	   to	  detect	   vulnerabilities	   to	  global	   financial	   stability,	   the	  EWE	   incorporates	  measures	  of	   common	  
distress	   across	   global	   financial	   institutions	   and	  nonfinancial	   firms,	   as	  well	   as	   across	   sovereigns	   and	   asset	  
markets	  (such	  as	  equity	  and	  credit	  markets)	  and	  data	  on	  cross-­‐border	  bank	  exposures	  (IMF	  2010b:	  16).	  	  
	  
Next	  to	  the	  focus	  on	  financial	  sector	  issues,	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  debate	  and	  reforms	  also	  indicate	  strengthened	  
efforts	  in	  deepening	  understanding	  of	  the	  links	  between	  financial	  and	  real	  activity	  and	  refining	  analysis	  of	  
interconnectedness	   (IMF	  2012).	   In	   short,	   the	  Fund	   is	   reorienting	   the	   focus	  of	   its	   surveillance	   instruments	  
towards	  a	  macrofinancial	  or	  systemic	  approach	  (Moschella	  2011).	  As	  the	  IMF	  (2012:	  4)	  puts	  it:	  
	  
Recognizing	   the	   increased	   interconnectedness	   among	   countries	   and	   financial	   markets,	  
there	   is	   a	   need	   for	   a	   more	   systemic	   focus,	   as	   well	   as	   a	   more	   integrated	   approach	   to	  
macrofinancial	  policies,	  at	  the	  global	  level.	  	  
	  
In	  other	  words,	   IMF	  surveillance	   instruments	  have	  been	  refocused	  to	   the	  task	  of	   ‘connecting	  the	  dots’	   in	  
order	   to	   improve	   the	   organization’s	   understanding	   of	   the	   spillovers	   from	  highly	   interconnected	   financial	  
centres,	   institutions,	   and	   markets.	   To	   achieve	   this	   goal,	   the	   Fund	   has	   launched	   spill-­‐over	   reports	   for	  
systematically-­‐important	  countries,	   including	  the	  United	  States,	  China,	   Japan,	  the	  Eurozone	  countries	  and	  
the	  United	  Kingdom.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  it	  has	  developed	  assessments	  of	  the	  international	  impact	  of	  the	  policies	  
of	  the	  world’s	  five	  largest	  economies.	  The	  increased	  attention	  towards	  spillovers	   in	  surveillance	  activity	   is	  
further	  attested	  in	  the	  Decision	  on	  Bilateral	  and	  Multilateral	  Surveillance	  adopted	  by	  the	  Fund’s	  Executive	  
Board	  in	  July	  2012,	  i.e.	  the	  Integrated	  Surveillance	  Decision	  (ISD).	  Under	  the	  new	  Decision,	  if	  spillovers	  from	  
a	   member’s	   policies	   are	   considered	   to	   have	   the	   potential	   to	   undermine	   global	   economic	   and	   financial	  
stability,	  these	  policies	  need	  to	  be	  discussed	  with	  the	  member	  within	  the	  Fund’s	  bilateral	  surveillance	  (ISD 
paragraphs 22(iii)(b), 22(iv), 22 (vii)).	  The	  reorientation	  towards	  systemic	  surveillance	  is	  further	  evident	  in	  
the	  design	  of	  the	  EWE	  which	  ‘aims	  to	  “connect	  the	  dots”	  between	  different	  risks,	  uncovering	  the	  scope	  for	  
potential	  spillovers,	  and	  to	  understand	  their	  systemic	  impact.	  …	  focusing	  on	  channels	  of	  transmission	  and	  
contagion’	  (IMF	  2010b:	  10).	  The	  Fund	  is	  aware	  of	  the	  need	  to	  combine	  more	  effectively	  the	  findings	  of	  its	  
bilateral	  and	  multilateral	  surveillance	  to	  deepen	   its	  understanding	  of	   the	   links	  between	  financial	  and	  real	  
activity	  (IMF	  2011b).	  
	  
Finally,	  and	  closely	  connected	  to	  the	  transformations	  described	  thus	  far,	  the	  crisis	  seems	  to	  have	  brought	  
about	  some	  important	  changes	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  belief	  system.	  In	  particular,	  the	  IMF’s	  efforts	  at	  building	  a	  
macrofinancial	   approach	   to	   surveillance	   point	   to	   a	   new	   understanding	   of	   what	   is	   the	  most	   appropriate	  
focus	   of	   the	   policies	   of	   this	   area	   (Moschella	   2011).	   In	   particular,	   similar	   to	   the	   shift	   towards	  
macroprudential	  regulation	  that	  is	  taking	  place	  in	  international	  supervisory	  bodies	  such	  as	  the	  BIS	  and	  the	  
FSB	  (Baker	  2012),	  the	  shift	  in	  the	  IMF	  suggests	  that	  the	  focus	  of	  international	  surveillance	  should	  no	  longer	  
be	  confined	  to	  that	  of	  enhancing	  transparency	  and	  information	  to	  the	  markets,	  based	  on	  the	  belief	  that	  the	  
private	  sector	  ‘knows	  best’	  how	  to	  contribute	  to	  global	  financial	  stability	  (Kodres	  &	  Narain	  2010,	  4).	  Rather,	  
the	  focus	  of	  international	  surveillance	  should	  be	  on	  the	  markets	  themselves.	  As	  the	  IMF	  unmistakeably	  puts	  
it	   in	  one	  of	   the	  documents	   in	  which	   it	   investigates	   the	  causes	  of	   the	  crisis,	   the	   financial	   turmoil	   revealed	  
that	  ‘market	  discipline	  failed	  as	  optimism	  prevailed,	  due	  diligence	  was	  outsourced	  to	  credit	  rating	  agencies,	  
and	  a	  financial	  sector	  compensation	  system	  based	  on	  short-­‐term	  profits	  reinforced	  the	  momentum	  for	  risk	  
taking’	  (IMF	  2009a,	  2;	  also	  de	  Laroisiére	  2009;	  Financial	  Service	  Authority	  2009).	  	  
	  
Next	   to	   the	   emerging	   change	   in	   the	   belief	   in	  market	   discipline,	   the	   crisis	   and	   the	   attendant	   reforms	   to	  
surveillance	  activities	  within	  and	  outside	  the	  IMF	  suggest	  another	  area	  where	  pre-­‐crisis	  beliefs	  have	  at	  least	  
been	   shaken.	   While	   it	   was	   widely	   believed	   the	   international	   surveillance	   should	   focus	   primarily	   on	   the	  
domestic	  financial	  systems	  in	  emerging	  market	  countries,	  one	  of	  the	  lessons	  of	  the	  crisis	  has	  been	  that	  such	  
a	  limited	  focus	  was	  not	  helpful	  to	  the	  maintenance	  of	  global	  financial	  stability.	  Indeed,	  advanced	  economies	  
constituted	   a	   primary	   source	   of	   risk,	   not	   only	   for	   the	   eruption	   of	   the	   crisis	   but	   also	   for	   its	   contagion,	  
primarily	  via	  the	  financial	  channels.	  As	  the	  IMF	  (2011c:	  15)	  puts	  it,	  ‘the	  experience	  of	  the	  crisis	  suggests	  that	  
more	  effective	  advanced	  economy	   regulation	  and	   supervision—consistent	  with	   international	   standards—
would	  not	  only	  have	  better	   supported	  domestic	   stability,	  but	  would	  also	  have	  helped	  make	  capital	   flows	  
safer.’	   As	   a	   result,	   many	   of	   the	   surveillance	   reforms	   have	   explicitly	   been	   targeted	   at	   reinforcing	   the	  
surveillance	  over	  advanced	  economies.	  The	  Fund’s	  vulnerability	  exercise	  for	  advanced	  economies,	  as	  well	  
as	   the	   systemic	   spill-­‐over	   reports,	   are	   among	   the	   clearest	   examples	   in	   this	   regard.	   To	   these,	   we	   can	  
certainly	  add	  the	  G20	  surveillance	  exercise	  and	  the	  FSB	  peer-­‐review	  processes.	  
	  
In	  summary,	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  major	  changes	  have	  taken	  place	  in	  the	  conduct	  of	  
IMF	   surveillance.	   These	   changes	   relate	   to	   the	   collaboration	   with	   other	   international	   bodies	   tasked	   with	  
surveillance	  functions,	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  instruments	  used	  in	  the	  exercise	  of	  these	  functions	  and	  the	  core	  
beliefs	  that	  guide	  them.	  The	  conclusions	  to	  the	  chapter	  now	  reflect	  on	  the	  implications	  of	  these	  findings	  for	  





It	   is	  widely	   recognised	   that	  an	  external	   shock,	   such	  as	  a	   financial	   crisis,	   is	   likely	   to	  act	  as	   the	  catalyst	   for	  
institutional	   change.	   The	   global	   financial	   crisis	   has	   been	   no	   exception,	   with	   ‘change’	   touted	   as	   the	  
catchword	   in	  the	   international	   financial	  governance	  debate	   (Moschella	  &	  Tsingou	  2013).	  This	  chapter	  has	  
engaged	  with	   the	   question	  of	   change	   in	   the	   aftermath	  of	   the	   crisis	   by	   focusing	   on	   the	   adjustments	   that	  
have	  taken	  place	  in	  the	  governance	  arrangements	  that	  preside	  over	  the	  conduct	  of	  surveillance,	  particularly	  
as	  they	  affect	  IMF	  surveillance.	  
	  
The	  findings	  suggest	  some	  important	  implications	  for	  both	  global	  financial	  governance	  and	  the	  IMF.	  	  From	  a	  
global	  perspective,	   the	  evidence	   lends	   support	   to	  existing	  propositions	   that	   the	  global	   financial	   crisis	  has	  
the	   potential	   to	   generate	   a	   profound	   reorientation	   in	   the	   philosophy	   that	   underpins	   global	   financial	  
regulation	  and	  supervision	  (Baker	  2012;	  Foot	  &	  Walter	  2011,	  249;	  Germain	  2010;	  Pagliari	  2012;	  for	  a	  more	  
sceptical	  view,	  see	  Broome,	  Clegg	  &	  Rethel	  2012).	  Although	  the	  initial	  response	  to	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  
reiterated	  the	  need	  to	  rely	  on	  greater	  transparency,	  disclosure	  and	  improved	  risk	  management	  as	  the	  most	  
appropriate	  responses	  to	  the	  financial	  turmoil	  (Best	  2010),	  the	  debate	  has	  since	  shifted	  to	  the	  question	  of	  
how	  to	  strengthen	  public-­‐sector	  initiatives,	  be	  they	  the	  improvement	  of	  IMF	  surveillance	  or	  the	  creation	  of	  
new	   international	   bodies	   such	   as	   the	   FSB.	   Of	   course,	   this	   does	   not	   imply	   that	   market	   discipline	   has	  
disappeared	  from	  the	  philosophy	  that	  underpins	  processes	  of	  global	  surveillance.	  More	  narrowly,	  the	  post-­‐
crisis	   debate	   and	   the	   new	  macrofinancial	   or	   systemic	   approach	   to	   surveillance	   imply	   a	   higher	   degree	   of	  
intervention	  by	  public	  authorities	  and	  a	  shift	  away	  from	  an	  excessive	  reliance	  on	  the	  principles	  of	  market	  
discipline	  (e.g.	  IMF,	  Bank	  for	  International	  Settlements	  &	  the	  Financial	  Stability	  Board	  2009).	  
	  
As	  for	  the	  IMF,	  the	  changes	  that	  are	  documented	  in	  this	  chapter	  indicate	  the	  emergence	  of	  at	  least	  three	  
challenges	   for	   the	  organisation.	  First,	   the	  progressive	   fragmentation	  of	   international	   surveillance	  calls	   for	  
the	  establishment	  of	  mechanisms	  of	   cooperation	   among	   the	  many	   institutions	   involved.	   For	   instance,	   as	  
noted	  earlier,	  the	  strengthened	  surveillance	  role	  for	  the	  FSB	  risks	  creating	  tensions	  and	  duplication	  of	  work	  
with	  the	   IMF.	  This	  development	  thus	  requires	  the	  establishment	  of	  an	  appropriate	  division	  of	   labour	  and	  
mechanisms	  of	   inter-­‐institutional	  collaboration	   (Draghi	  &	  Strauss-­‐Khan	  2008).	   In	   the	  conduct	  of	   the	  EWE,	  
agreement	   has	   been	   reached	   that	   the	   IMF	   will	   lead	   the	   work	   on	   macroeconomic	   and	   macrofinancial	  
vulnerabilities,	  while	  the	  FSB	  will	  take	  the	  lead	  on	  vulnerabilities	  and	  regulatory	  challenges	  in	  the	  financial	  
sector	  (IMF	  2010b:	  4).	  
	  
Second,	   the	   rejection	   of	   a	   more	   robust	   framework	   for	   surveillance	   –	   including	   potential	   sanctions	   on	  
countries	  for	  non-­‐compliance	  with	  the	  Fund’s	  recommendations	  –	  casts	  doubt	  on	  the	  potential	  of	  the	  IMF’s	  
procedures	   of	   multilateral	   surveillance	   to	   induce	   change	   (for	   an	   alternative	   approach	   to	   sanctions,	   see	  
Palais	  Royale	  Initiative	  2011;	  Truman	  2010).	  As	  has	  often	  been	  noted	  (Broome	  &	  Seabrooke	  2007;	  Lombardi	  
&	  Woods	  2008),	  IMF	  surveillance	  is	  severely	  limited	  by	  the	  inherent	  voluntarism	  of	  soft	  law,	  which	  is	  unable	  
to	  oblige	  reluctant	  governments	  to	  change	  their	  policies.	  
	   	  
Finally,	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  changes	  to	  IMF	  surveillance	  pose	  important	  efficiency	  and	  legitimacy	  challenges	  that	  
derive	   from	   shift	   towards	   a	   systemic	   surveillance	   approach	   (Moschella	   2012b).	   As	   for	   the	   efficiency	  
challenge,	   a	   question	   can	  be	   raised	   regarding	  whether	   the	   Fund’s	   organisational	   culture	   is	   ready	   for	   the	  
complexities	  associated	  with	  conduct	  of	  systemic	  surveillance.	  For	   instance,	   it	  has	  been	  repeatedly	  noted	  
that	  poor	  financial	  expertise	  has	  prevented	  the	  Fund	  from	  developing	  fully-­‐formed	  understandings	  of	  the	  
relationship	   between	   financial	   sector	   weaknesses	   and	   global	   macroeconomic	   and	   financial	   stability	   on	  
several	  occasions	  (e.g.	  IMF	  1999;	  Moschella	  2011).	  This	  pattern	  was	  replicated	  in	  the	  run-­‐up	  to	  the	  global	  
financial	  crisis.	   Indeed,	  the	  dominant	  macroeconomic	  expertise	  of	   IMF	  staff	  helps	  explain	  why,	   in	  spite	  of	  
the	   alarm	   bell	   sounded	   by	   the	   crises	   of	   the	   1990s,	   staff	   continued	   to	   focus	   on	   factors	   such	   as	   global	  
imbalances	  and	  disorderly	  dollar	  decline	  as	  the	  key	  risks	  to	  global	  stability,	  largely	  failing	  to	  take	  action	  to	  
address	  the	  risks	  building	  up	  in	  the	  financial	  sector	  (Independent	  Evaluation	  Office	  2011).	  Within	  the	  IMF,	  
these	   problems	   are	   well-­‐known	   (IMF	   2011b),	   as	   reflected	   in	   the	   Action	   Plan	   for	   Surveillance	  where	   the	  
Managing	   Director	   calls	   for	   increased	   use	   of	   financial	   sector	   expertise	   in	   Article	   IV	   consultations	   to	   be	  
achieved	  by	  assigning	  a	   financial	  expert	   to	  each	  Article	   IV	   team	  for	  countries	  with	  systemically	   important	  
financial	  sectors	  and	  for	  countries	  with	  mounting	  financial	  vulnerabilities,	  as	  well	  as	  by	  deepening	  internal	  
training	  on	  these	  issues	  (IMF	  2012,	  8).	  	  
	  
Furthermore,	  a	  major	  concern	  surrounds	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  IMF	  to	  the	  collect	  the	  relevant	  data	  to	  conduct	  
systemic	  surveillance	  (Moschella	  2012b).	  Indeed,	  systemic	  surveillance	  entails	  taking	  into	  the	  consideration	  
not	   only	   government	   policies	   but	   the	   activities	   of	   those	   actors	   that	   form	   the	   financial	   system,	   including	  
large	   financial	   institutions,	   counterparties	   and	   asset	   managers.	   The	   problem	   for	   the	   IMF	   is	   that	   having	  
access	  to	  this	  information	  would	  require	  the	  organisation	  to	  request	  its	  members	  to	  report	  data	  that	  they	  
are	   not	   currently	   obliged	   to	   report.5	   The	   IMF	   is	   well	   aware	   of	   these	   shortcomings.	   For	   instance,	   in	   a	  
background	  paper	  to	  the	  proposal	  to	  give	  the	  Fund	  the	  role	  of	  a	  systemic	  supervisor,	  it	  acknowledges	  that,	  
‘although	  financial	  network	  analysis	  is	  increasingly	  recognized	  as	  a	  priority,	  the	  limited	  availability	  of	  data	  is	  
a	  major	   challenge.	  Progress	   in	  mapping	   the	   international	   financial	   network	   is	  most	   advanced	   in	  banking,	  
based	  on	  data	  collected	  by	  the	  BIS.	  ...	  But	  in	  other	  areas,	  there	  are	  substantial	  data	  gaps’	  (IMF	  2010c:	  9).	  In	  
particular,	   the	   most	   serious	   gaps	   concern	   data-­‐related	   exposures	   and	   maturities	   in	   debt	   securities	   and	  
derivatives	  markets,	  foreign	  exchange	  markets	  and	  international	  equity	  markets.	  Data	  are	  not	  only	  missing.	  
In	  other	  cases,	  data	  do	  exist	  but	  not	  in	  a	  useable	  form.	  This	  is	  particularly	  the	  case	  for	  networks	  involving	  
decentralised	  over-­‐the-­‐counter	   (OTC)	  markets	  where	   intermediaries	   typically	   know	   their	   own	   	   exposures	  
but	  not	  those	  of	  counterparties.	  However,	   this	  discussion	   is	  not	  meant	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	   IMF	  has	  not	  –	  
and	  is	  not	  able	  to	  develop	  –	  the	  analytical	  skills	  to	  undertake	  a	  through	  surveillance	  of	  the	  global	  financial	  
system,	  as	  some	  commentators	   imply	   (Bossone	  2009).	  The	  problem	   is	  more	  simply	   that	   the	  reforms	  that	  
are	   taking	   place	   in	   IMF	   surveillance	   are	   at	   the	   limits	   of	   the	   Fund’s	   expertise	   and	   resources,	   raising	   the	  
question	  of	  whether	  the	  organisation	  is	  up	  to	  the	  task.	  
	  
Finally,	   next	   to	   efficiency	   challenges	   there	   are	   also	   legitimacy	   challenges,	   associated	   with	   the	   shift	   to	   a	  
macrofinancial	  or	  systemic	  approach	  to	  surveillance.	  Exploiting	  the	  discretion	  accorded	  to	  the	  Fund	  in	  the	  
conduct	   of	   surveillance,	   the	   Fund	   is	   suggesting	   incorporating	   systemic	   surveillance	   into	   its	   mandate	   by	  
changing	   its	   staff’s	   operational	   practices	   and	   adjusting	   existing	   instruments.	   In	   other	   words,	   no	   formal	  
change	  to	  the	  Fund’s	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	   is	  envisaged	  and	  the	  discussion	  on	  a	  Multilateral	  Surveillance	  
Decision,	   which	   would	   help	   clarify	   the	   scope	   and	   modalities	   of	   the	   new	   surveillance,	   is	   staked	   on	   the	  
premise	  that	  such	  a	  decision	  is	  not	  proposed	  for	  adoption	  –	  at	  this	  stage,	  at	  least	  (IMF	  2010a:	  6).	  However,	  
switching	  to	  systemic	  surveillance	  without	  a	  formal	  mandate	  cannot	  but	  aggravate	  the	  crisis	  of	   legitimacy	  
of	   the	   organisation,	   especially	   in	   light	   of	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   proposed	   reform.	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   the	   lack	   of	  
legalisation	  of	   IMF	   reform	  risks	  compromising	   the	   legitimacy	  of	   the	  organization	   (see	  Beetham	  1991:	  17-­‐
21),	   undermining	   the	   very	   effectiveness	   of	   the	   proposed	   reform.	   Indeed,	   developing	   an	   approach	   to	  
financial	  supervision	  that	   is	  premised	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  domestic	  financial	  sector	  policies	  should	  be	  
judged	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   spill-­‐over	   effects	   for	   other	   countries	   requires	   significant	   political	   support,	   since	  
members,	   at	   least	   in	   principle,	   agree	   to	   adjust	   their	   financial	   policies	   not	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   their	   domestic	  
economy	  but	  for	  the	  well-­‐being	  of	  the	  international	  system.	  Hence,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  necessary	  political	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Although under Article IV, Section 3(b) member countries have an obligation to provide the Fund with the 
information needed to conduct bilateral surveillance over exchange rate policies, Article VIII, Section 5 clarifies that 
members are under no obligation to provide information ‘in such detail that the affairs of individuals or corporations are 
disclosed.’  
support,	  a	  change	  in	  the	  Fund’s	  mode	  of	  surveillance	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  fully	  implemented,	  making	  the	  overall	  
project	  of	  reforming	  IMF	  surveillance	  less	  successful	  than	  its	  designers	  believe	  it	  will	  be.	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